Nahla Abdel Moneim
Recent years in Egypt have formed a collective awareness about the Brotherhood’s possession of a military wing that represents a basic trend in the internal terrorist organization. The group has always been promoted as a peaceful follower in order to achieve its political goals, but the amount of violence and actual scenes produced by the organization’s youth highlight the existence of an armed trend that the leaders have not abandoned despite the presence of a national authority, not an occupier.
What formed from the mental image of the group within the framework of militarization is not concerned for the most part with the organizational hierarchy of the armed wing or the nature of its equipment and ordinances as a living and serial model, but the most important thing is the belief that members of the organization hold about armament and military training, not as part of the structural upbringing, rather as a practice linked to membership in the Brotherhood and the awaited doctrine for the opportunity to be implemented.
Armed wing’s doctrinal nature
The well-established organizational doctrine about willingness to bear arms, in addition to other political factors, are the most prominent drivers that supported the popular rejection of the Brotherhood’s continued rule of Egypt and the removal of late Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi from power.
Observers of public affairs began to pay attention to the group’s continued adoption of violent ideology in the modern era since the military parade of its youth at Al-Azhar University in December 2006 against the background of their objection to their exclusion from the Student Union elections. The students wore black clothes and face masks with the inscription “Resisters” as they practiced martial arts, resembling armed militias.
This incident showed the fact that the organization’s youth receive military training collectively and systematically, and that the group is not honest in its political and religious theses, while the standards of peace and slogans, such as “Islam is the solution”, are just formulations of the popular crowd.
On the other hand, some disengaged leaders, such as Kamal al-Helbawi, differ from the Brotherhood regarding the continuation of the activity of the armed wing in an organizational and gradual manner within the group, as was the case during the special organization. He denied in an interview with the delegation on October 31, 2012 that the special organization responsible for armed operations continues.
Helbawi stressed that it ended in the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the special organization is the current carrying arms within the Brotherhood under the auspices of Abdul Rahman Al-Sindi (1918-1962) and carried out a number of assassinations.
Despite these statements, the violent ideology remained rooted in the group and was only waiting for the decisive moments to express itself in fulfillment of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna’s commandments towards the industry of death.
Power demonstrated Brotherhood’s violent ideology
The Al-Azhar University incident was not the only direct contribution to the formation of the popular view of the group, but it gathered within a series of facts that showed the group’s violence, not only while they were in the ranks of the opposition, but also while they were in power.
During Morsi’s rule, it became clear that there was a current carrying weapons within the organization, as the group called on its members to gather in front of the presidential Ittihadiya Palace in 2012 to attack the demonstrators who rejected the constitutional declaration launched by Morsi, and then fighting began in the area and claimed dozens of victims.
During the group’s rule, Egypt witnessed a complete destruction on Fridays of every week, as the media were successively broadcasting clips of the violence of demonstrators who rallied at the orders of their leaders for a false victory that left the internal stability of the country destabilized through the millions that the Brotherhood released for political purposes to demonstrate their power on the ground, which in turn left a general discontent with the disruption of normal life and damage to economic activities, especially for the middle and upper middle classes.
With the Brotherhood’s loss of power in Egypt after a major popular revolution in 2013, this armed branch clearly appeared in operations that leader Mohamed Beltagy had threatened, along with armed movements that emerged directly from the group, such as Hasm and the Revolution Brigade, which raised arms against the people and security forces.