Since Tunisia clashed with the Brotherhood-affiliated Ennahda movement on July 25, 2021, the state has entered successive phases of clashes, the latest of which is the approval of the Ministry of Family, Women, Family, Childhood and Seniors to issue new conditions for how to open kindergartens, considered the first conditions manual to be approved by Tunisia since the manual of 2003, which the country has worked with for more than fifteen years.
In its first reaction to the approval of the terms of reference, the Free Destourian Party denounced the approval of the Minister of Women, Family, Childhood and Seniors, Amal Hajj Moussa Ali, describing the ministry’s decisions in a communiqué as a deviation in power and overstepping the powers specified under Chapter 80 of the constitution.
The party explained that the new manual did not receive sufficient study and in-depth and transparent dialogue about its provisions, which it considers not included among the exceptional measures permitted, according to the text of the communication. The party focused its reservations on allowing the new manual for associations to establish homes for the care and education of children, explaining that the article “will open the door to suspicious associations that spread obscurantist ideology and receive foreign funds of unknown origin and enjoy the power’s cover-up over them.”
“It will enable it to control the childhood sector, tamper with children, and corrupt future generations. It will also give way to the political employment of the childhood sector through the octopus of associations that represent the hidden arm of several political organizations, which will confuse the educational process and create an unbalanced atmosphere within the sector,” it continued.
The party demanded that the Minister of Women retract the aforementioned manual of conditions, hinting at the possibility of a judicial appeal to annul the approval.
In recent months, Tunisia has made many efforts to close the doors through which Ennahda and the rest of the religious entities infiltrated the vital sectors. In particular, Ennahda was able to infiltrate the joints of the Tunisian state and institutions against the background of its management of Tunisia over the last ten years. With the July 25 directive and the subsequent decisions that marginalized Ennahda and vowed to open the files, Tunisians are optimistic about the end of Ennahda and its ilk and blocking all the outlets through which they infiltrate. However, this optimism began to decline during the last month after some voices that adopted the discourse of disappointment rose on July 25, 2021.
Falling under this discourse is the failure to resolve any of the files of the Ennahda movement so far, including the file of the assassinations of leftist Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, who were killed in 2003. Not only that, but Tunisia witnessed during the past month an operation suspected of being an assassination, when a police officer named Mohsen al-Adili was found hanging in his home. Adili was scheduled to give a testimony on the morning of his death against the Ennahda movement in the file of the returnees from Syria, yet the Tunisian administration did not take exceptional decisions parallel to the event, contenting itself with opening an investigation.
This differs with the enthusiastic discourse that President Kais Saied has always used since he entered into a clash with Ennahda, as he has long vowed to hold the movement accountable and open up the silenced files.
Tunisian political writer Nizar Al-Jledi expressed a kind of disappointment after the performance of the Tunisian administration during the recent period, assuring to the Reference that he had hoped for bolder and more determined decisions to reveal the truth of Ennahda.